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logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitraryspeciﬁcation
of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence
to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential
games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers
beyond the class of exact potential games. We also study to which
extent equilibrium selection is robust to the speciﬁcation of revision
opportunities. Our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide
class of learning dynamics in games.
Keywords: Learning in games, logit-response dynamics, best-response
potential games.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, D83.
 We thank Hans Haller, Josef Hofbauer, Arthur Robson and Bill Sandholm for help-
ful comments. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Project
P18141-G09 is gratefully acknowledged.
†University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Box 150, D-78457 Konstanz, Ger-
many. E-mail: Carlos.Alos-Ferrer@uni-konstanz.de
‡University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich,
Switzerland. E-mail: Nick.Netzer@soi.uzh.ch.
11 Introduction
Models of learning in games typically start with the speciﬁcation of a basic
behavioral rule on the side of the players, e.g. myopic best reply, truncated
ﬁctitious play, or a variant of imitation. Since such basic dynamics exhibit
a multiplicity of rest points (e.g., any Nash equilibrium is a rest point for a
myopic best reply dynamics), it is necessary to perform a stability test.
Within the class of discrete-time, ﬁnite population models, one of the
most successful paradigms in the literature performs this test by adding
noise to the basic dynamics and studying the long-run outcomes as noise
vanishes. Formally, the basic dynamics is a Markov chain1 with multiple ab-
sorbing sets, which is made irreducible by the addition of noise. Probably the
best-known example of this methodology is the mistakes model, essentially
introduced by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) (for an imitation rule),
Young (1993), and Kandori and Rob (1995) (for myopic best reply). In this
model, agents are assumed to have a certain probability (independent across
agents and periods) of making mistakes, where a mistake is deﬁned as choos-
ing some strategy at random, with a full-support probability distribution.
The mistake distribution is typically assumed to be uniform, although this
is of no relevance. The important feature of the model is that the shape of
this distribution is independent of the noise level.
The mistakes model has delivered important messages, ranging from the
almost universal selection of risk-dominant equilibria (as opposed to Pareto
e cient ones) in coordination games (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993),
Young (1993)), to the dynamic relevance of “perfectly competitive” outcomes
in aggregative games (Vega-Redondo (1997), Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2005)).
One of the most attractive features of the mistakes model is that, thanks to a
result due to Freidlin and Wentzell (1988), it is possible to provide a simple
characterization of the set of long-run outcomes. These outcomes, called
stochastically stable states, are those having positive probability in the limit
1Throughout this paper, the term “Markov chain” refers to a discrete-time Markov
chain with stationary transition probabilities and ﬁnite state space.
2invariant distribution as noise vanishes. The well-known characterization
relies on minimizing the number of mutations associated to the transitions
depicted in certain graphs (trees) deﬁned on the state space.
This approach is not exempt of critiques. First and foremost, selection
results are based on the number of mistakes necessary to destabilize a given
state, but, in a sense, all mistakes are treated equally. For example, choosing
a strategy which delivers almost a best response is just as severe a mistake
as choosing a strategy which delivers payo s far away from the optimum.
Thus, the approach relies on the (cardinal) payo s of the game only to a
limited extent. Second, Bergin and Lipman (1996) observed that, if the dis-
tribution of mistakes is allowed to be state-dependent, the model can be
twisted to select any pre-speciﬁed rest point. Thus, it becomes necessary to
have a well-justiﬁed theory on the origin of mistakes.2 One particular model
that accounts for both problems is the logit response dynamics, which was
introduced in Blume (1993). In this dynamics, which can be derived from
a random utility model, players adopt an action according to a full-support
distribution of the logit form, which allocates larger probability to those ac-
tions which would deliver (myopically) larger payo s. It therefore combines
the advantage of having a speciﬁc theory about the origin of mistakes with
the fact that it takes the magnitude of (suboptimal) payo sf ully into ac-
count. Noise is incorporated in the speciﬁcation from the onset, but choices
concentrate on best responses as noise vanishes.
The logit-response dynamics is not a particular case of the mistakes
model, and thus cannot beneﬁt from the characterization of long-run out-
comes mentioned above. Indeed, results for the logit-response dynamics are
harder to obtain and are restricted to particularly well-behaved classes of
games. For example, binary action games (as in Blume (2003) or Maruta
(2002)) give rise to a birth-death chain whose invariant distribution can be
2In van Damme and Weibull (2002), mistakes arise in a rationalistic model where
agents have to exert costly e ort to reduce mistake probabilities. Blume (2003) responds
to the Bergin and Lipman critique by characterizing the class of noise processes that select
risk-dominant equilibria in coordination games.
3characterized directly. Further, as shown by Blume (1997), if the base game
admits an exact potential, the process is reversible and again the invariant
distribution can be characterized directly. In addition to the restricted class
of games, the existing results also rely on speciﬁc assumptions about revision
opportunities, most notably on the assumption of one-at-a-time updating
(asynchronous learning). Given the sensitivity of the original mistakes model
to the speciﬁcation of the dynamics, where it is sometimes the case that “who
learns when” is as important as “who learns how”, studying robustness issues
is fundamental.
In this paper we develop a characterization of the long-run outcomes of
the logit-response dynamics for arbitrary ﬁnite normal-form games. Fur-
thermore, our result applies to a generalization of the original logit-response
dynamics. In particular, we allow for an arbitrary speciﬁcation of revision op-
portunities, encompassing e.g. independent revision opportunities (as in most
versions of the mistakes model) and asynchronous learning (as in Blume’s
(1993) model). In order to obtain our results, we build on the analysis of
Freidlin and Wentzell (1988) to characterize the invariant distribution of the
logit-response dynamics for ﬁxed noise levels, and use it to develop a char-
acterization of the stochastically stable states.
In order to illustrate the method and its applicability, we proceed to study
the convergence of the logit-response model for the various generalizations
of the concept of potential game. Our method allows us to o er simple an-
swers to several open questions. We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, convergence to the set
of Nash equilibria cannot be guaranteed for Monderer and Shapley’s (1996)
generalized ordinal potential games, but, second, convergence does obtain
for Voorneveld’s (2000) best-response potential games. We also show that
the latter result is robust to the speciﬁcation of revision opportunities un-
der an additional condition which is satisﬁed both by independent inertia
and asynchronous learning models. Third, we study the value of potential
maximizers as an equilibrium reﬁnement and ﬁnd that the selection of po-
tential maximizers (which obtains for exact potential games under Blume’s
4(1993) asynchronous learning dynamics) fails two robustness tests. First, it
fails even for exact potential games if revision opportunities do not fall into
the asynchronous learning category. Second, it fails for any generalization of
potential games even if revision opportunities are asynchronous.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the logit-response
dynamics and introduces our generalized dynamics. Section 3 presents our
characterization of stochastically stable states, whose (technical) proof is
relegated to the Appendix. Section 4 applies this characterization to the
logit-response dynamics in best-response potential games. Section 5 discusses
a generalization of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Logit-Response Dynamics
2.1 The Logit Choice Function
Let   =( I,(Si,u i)i I) be a ﬁnite normal-form game with player set I =
{1,2,...,N}, strategy sets Si and payo  functions ui deﬁned on the set of
pure strategy proﬁles S = S1   ...   SN. For a given player i, denote by
S i =
 
j =i Sj the set of pure strategy proﬁles of i’s opponents. Following
convention, we denote s =( si,s  i)   S and ui(si,s  i)=ui(s).
The game is played by boundedly rational players, who behave as my-
opic best repliers, but tremble in their decisions. Every period, some set of
players is chosen to update their actions. We will further specify revision
opportunities below.
When given the chance to revise, player i observes the actions s i of the
opponents. The probability of choosing action si given the current proﬁle





i Si e ui(s 
i,s i), (1)
where 0 <   <  .
The scalar   can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the level of noise
in players’ decisions. As      , the described rule converges to the myopic
5best reply rule. For any 0 <   <  , players choose non-best replies with
positive probability, but actions that yield smaller payo s are chosen with
smaller probability. The dynamic adjustment process deﬁnes an irreducible
and aperiodic Markov chain {X
 
t }t N on the state space S, with stationary
transition probabilities P
 
ss  = Pr
 (st = s |st 1 = s) and (unique) invariant
distribution µ .
For any speciﬁcation of revision opportunities, we will refer to this dy-
namics as a logit response dynamics. Consider the particular case where
exactly one player is randomly selected each period to revise his strategy,3
and let qi > 0 denote the probability that player i is selected. For this case,
which we will refer to as asynchronous learning, the dynamics was ﬁrst in-
troduced (with qi = 1
/N) by Blume (1993)4 and has been further developed
in e.g. Blume (1997, 2003), Young (1998), and Baron, Durieu, Haller, and
Solal (2002a, 2002b). Taken as a behavioral rule, the underlying logit choice
function (1) is rooted in the psychology literature (Thurstone (1927)). From
the microeconomic point of view, it can be given a justiﬁcation in terms of
a random-utility model (see e.g. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) for details).
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002, Section 2) observe that it is also the only





i Si w(ui(s 
i,s  i))
with w(·) an increasing and di erentiable function of the payo s, which can
be derived as the result of both a stochastic and a deterministic perturbation
of the payo s.5 Thus, the logit-response dynamics exhibits solid decision-
theoretic foundations.
3This can be interpreted as a reduced form (technically, the embedded chain) of a
continuous-time model where players receive revision opportunities according to “Poisson
alarm clocks.”
4Blume (1993) refers to this dynamics as log-linear response.
5Mattsson and Weibull (2002) and Baron, Durieu, Haller, and Solal (2002a, 2002b)
show that logit-response arises in the framework of van Damme and Weibull (2002) when
control costs adopt a speciﬁc functional form.
62.2 Asynchronous Logit Response in Potential Games
The game   is a potential game6 (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) if there
exists a function   : S   R, called the potential, such that for each i   I,
si,s  
i   Si, s i   S i
ui(si,s  i)   ui(s
 
i,s  i)= (si,s  i)    (s
 
i,s  i).
The global maximizers of the potential function   form a subset of the set
of Nash equilibria of  . If   is a potential game, it follows that ui(si,s  i)=






i Si e ui(s 
i,s i) =
e  (si,s i)
 
s 
i Si e  (s 
i,s i). (2)
It is then straightforward to show (see Blume (1997)) that the invariant
distribution of the logit-response dynamics adopts a Gibbs-Boltzmann form,
i.e. the potential function becomes a potential for the stochastic process. The
proof (which is included for completeness only) takes advantage of the fact
that the reformulation (2) implies that the process is reversible.
Proposition 1. Let   be a potential game with potential  . The invariant





s  S e  (s ).
Proof. It is enough to show that µ  as given in the statement satisﬁes the
detailed balance condition, i.e. µ (s)P
 
ss  = µ (s )P
 
s s for all s,s    S. This
is clearly fulﬁlled if s = s , and also if s and s  di er in more than one
coordinate, since P
 
ss  = P
 
s s = 0 in this case. Hence assume w.l.o.g. that s
and s  di er exactly in coordinate i, that is si  = s 
i and sj = s 








s   S e  (s  ) qi




i  Si e  (s  





6Also called partnership games. See Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988).
7Fix a strategy s0   Si, and deﬁne  (s i)=ui(s0,s  i)    (s0,s  i).
7where the last equality holds due to s i = s 
 i.  
As      , the invariant distribution of the process converges to an
invariant distribution of the best-reply dynamics. We say that a state s   S
is stochastically stable if lim    µ (s) > 0. An immediate consequence of
Proposition 1 is
Corollary 1. Let   be a potential game. The set of stochastically stable
states of the logit-response dynamics with asynchronous learning is equal to
the set of maximizers of  .
This Corollary provides of course a readily applicable result.8 In our view,
it is also important for two additional reasons. First, it is a convergence
result. The asynchronous logit response dynamics always converges to the
set of Nash equilibria in the class of exact potential games. Second, it is a
selection result. In particular, the logit-response dynamics provides support
for treating the set of potential maximizers as an equilibrium reﬁnement for
potential games.
The latter ﬁnding has motivated a large part of the literature of learning
in games in recent years, and indeed the selection of potential maximizers
has become a test of the reasonability of a learning dynamics.9 It is therefore
important to know how robust both parts of Corollary 1 are. That is, we
pose the question of whether the convergence to Nash equilibria and the
selection of potential maximizers extend to more general classes of games
and dynamics.
Proposition 1 (and hence Corollary 1), however, rely on the knife-edge
technical fact that the exact potential of the game allows to identify the in-
variant distribution of the stochastic process for positive noise level. Clearly,
the proof cannot be generalized any further. In the next section, we develop a
framework which will allow us to provide exact results for both more general
games and more general dynamics.
8For example, Sandholm (2007) relies on this result to build a model of evolutionary
implementation.
9See e.g. Hofbauer and Sorger (1999).
82.3 Revision Processes and a Generalized Dynamics
The existing results for the logit-response rule (as e.g. Corollary 1) rely on the
asynchronicity assumption to establish the convenient Gibbs-Boltzmann form
for the invariant distribution. Here we will consider a more general approach
allowing for arbitrary speciﬁcation of updating opportunities. We illustrate
this by considering a general class of revision processes. The motivation for
the generalization is as follows. In our view, a learning dynamics in games is
made of a behavioral rule and a speciﬁcation of revision opportunities (i.e.
the speed of the dynamics). Thus, it is important to know which results are
due to the behavioral rule and which ones hinge on the exact speciﬁcation of
the revision process. Studying general revision processesfor a given dynamics
therefore becomes an important robustness check.
Definition 1. A revision process is a probability measure q on the set of
subsets of I, P(I), such that
  i   I  J   I such that i   J and qJ > 0 (3)
where, for each J   I, qJ = q(J) is interpreted as the probability that exactly
players in J receive revision opportunities (independently across periods).
Condition (3) merely speciﬁes that every player has some probability of
being able to revise in some situation. No further restriction is placed on the
revision process, which allows for a wide range of models to be considered.
We list now three leading examples.
Let Rq = {J   I|qJ > 0} denote the set of revising sets, i.e. sets of
players which might obtain revision opportunity (as a whole) with positive
probability. If Rq = {{i}|i   I}, we say that the dynamics exhibits asyn-
chronous learning and write qi = q{i}. As commented above, this includes
the asynchronous logit-response dynamics of Blume (1993) (where qi = 1
N).
If Rq = P(I), we speak of independent learning. That is, every subset
of players has positive probability of being able to revise. For example, a
standard version of the mistakes model (see e.g. Sandholm (1998)) is a par-
ticular case which postulates independent inertia, i.e. each player revises with
9a ﬁxed, independent probability 0 <p<1. Thus qJ = p|J| (1   p)
N |J| > 0
for each subset J.
We can also consider a model of instantaneous learning, where all play-
ers receive revision opportunities every period, i.e. Rq = {I}. Other exam-
ples could include speciﬁc correlation in revision opportunities among certain
groups of players,10 or bounds to the number of players revising each period.
Fix a revision process q. For any two strategy proﬁles s,s    S, let
Rs,s  = {J   Rq|s 
k = sk  k/   J} be the set of revising sets potentially
leading from s to s . Note that from a given s   S, di erent alternative
revising sets might give rise to the same transition, because players selected
to revise might stay with their previous action. However, under asynchronous
learning |Rs,s |   1 for all s  = s . We say that a transition from s to s  is
feasible if Rs,s   =  .
The logit-response dynamics with revision process q is a Markov chain on
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j J uj(s 
j,s  j). Let RJ
s = {s    S|s 
k = sk  k/   J} be
the set of states potentially reached from s when the revising set is J. We







s   RJ
s e ·UJ(s  ,s). (4)
3 Stochastic Stability
Given a general revision process q, the logit-response dynamics is in general
not a birth-death chain. Even if this were the case (e.g. under asynchronicity
in binary action games), unless the game is an (exact) potential game an exact
characterization of the invariant distribution was until now not available. We
10Since we do not restrict attention to symmetric games, this possibility might be of in-
dependent interest, e.g. for buyers-sellers models as in Al´ os-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2007).
10now develop a characterization of the set of stochastically stable states of the
logit-response dynamics which relies precisely on such a characterization of
the invariant distribution.
Given a state s, deﬁne an s-tree to be a directed graph T such that there
exists a unique path from any state s    S to s. The key concept for our
characterization is as follows:
Definition 2. A revision s-tree is a pair (T, ) where
(i) T is an s-tree,
(ii) (s,s )   T only if Rs,s   =   (only feasible transitions are allowed), and
(iii)   : T   P(I) is such that  (s,s )   Rs,s  for all (s,s )   T.
Thus, there are two di erences between a revision tree and a tree as used
in the characterization for the mistakes model. First, in a revision s-tree,
edges corresponding to unfeasible transitions are not allowed.11 Second, in a
revision s-tree (T, ),   labels each edge of T with a revising set which makes
the corresponding transition potentially feasible.
Remark 1. Suppose that a revision process satisﬁes that for all s,s    S,
s  = s , either Rs,s  =   or |Rs,s | = 1. This is e.g. true for asynchronous
learning and instantaneous learning. Then, for each link (s,s ) in a revision
tree there exists exactly one revising set making the transition from s to s 
feasible. In other words, given a tree T using feasible transitions only, there
exists a unique mapping   such that (T, ) is a revision tree.
3.1 A Characterization
Let T (s) denote the set of revision s-trees. The waste of a revision tree










  U (s,s )(s
 ,s).
11Thus, actually the concept of revision tree depends on the revision process q. We drop


















In words, the waste of a revision tree adds all the individual (ex-ante,
myopic) payo  wastes generated across the transitions depicted in the tree,
relative to the payo s that could have been reached by adopting best re-
sponses. Obviously, a transition generates zero waste in this sum if and only
if it involves only best responses.
Intuitively, the waste of a revision tree is an inverse measure for its likeli-
hood in the logit-response dynamics. It is analogous to the concept of costs in
the mistakes model, with the obvious di erence that wastes are real numbers,
rather than natural ones (number of mistakes).12 The stochastic potential of
a given state is obtained by minimizing waste across revision trees rooted in
that state.
Definition 3. The stochastic potential of a state s is
W(s) = min
(T, ) T (s)
W(T, ).
As mentioned above, a state is stochastically stable if it has positive
probability in the limit invariant distribution of a noisy process as noise
vanishes (in our case, when      ). Our characterization of stochastically
stable states is as follows.
Theorem 1. Consider the logit-response dynamics (with any revision pro-
cess). A state is stochastically stable if and only if it minimizes W(s) among
all states.
12An alternative name for the waste would beregret. We prefer to avoid this name for two
reasons. First, there is a growing game-theoretic literature where players choose actions
according to their associated regret (see e.g. Hart and Mas-Colell (2000)). For us, the
waste is rather a technical device and not an objective target. Second, except in the case
of asynchronous learning, the waste of a player’s choice is only potential regret, since the
corresponding payo  will not actually be experienced due to other players simultaneously
updating their choices.
12The proof, which is relegated to the Appendix, is itself based on an ex-
act characterization of the invariant distribution for ﬁnite   (Lemma 2 in
the Appendix). Theorem 1 yields a “tree-surgery” technique for the charac-
terization of stochastically stable states of the logit-response dynamics, for
arbitrary ﬁnite normal-form games and with arbitrary revision processes. It
is analogous to the statement that stochastically stable states are those hav-
ing trees involving a minimal number of mistakes in the mistakes model. In
our framework, the number of mistakes is replaced by the sum of payo  losses
from transitions which are not possible in the limit as      .
This result makes it possible to focus on minimal waste revision trees
to examine stochastic stability. If the set of revising sets is a singleton for
every possible transition, as is the case e.g. for asynchronous and instanta-
neous learning, there is exactly one revision tree per tree involving feasible
transitions only, and thus we can directly examine minimal waste trees.
3.2 A Radius-Coradius Result
One of the most powerful results for the actual analysis of models based
on the mistakes formulation is the Radius-Coradius theorem due to Ellison
(2000). In order to support our tractability claim for the logit model, we
now prove a result analogous to Ellison’s (2000) Radius-Coradius Theorem
in our framework. A directed graph P on S is a path if there exists a ﬁnite,
repetition-free sequence (s0,s 1,...,sn) of states in S with n = |P|, such that
(sm,s m+1)   P and Rsm,sm+1  =   for all m =0 ,...,n   1. The state s0 is the
initial point of the path, the state sn is the terminal point. Since the logit
response dynamics is irreducible for any revision process, the set of paths
between any two given states is nonempty.
Note that a path as described above is an sn-tree on the subset of states
{s0,...,sn} and thus a revision path (P, ) can be simply deﬁned as a particu-
lar type of revision tree where P is a path. Denote the set of all revision paths
with initial point s and terminal point s  by P(s,s ). The waste W(P, ) of
a revision path (P, )   P(s,s ) is simply its waste as a revision tree.
13The basin of attraction13 of a state s, B(s)   S is the set of all states
s  such that there exists a revision path (P, )   P(s ,s) with W(P, ) = 0.
The limit set of state s is the set of states which are connected back-and-forth
with s at zero waste, i.e. L(s)={s    s|s    B(s) and s   B(s )}.
The Radius of a state s is deﬁned as
R(s) = min{W(P, )|s
  /   B(s),(P, )   P(s,s
 )}
and is a measure of how easy it is to leave state s. Since the waste is based
on payo  di erences and not number of mistakes, it takes into account not
only the size but also the “depth” of the basin of attraction. The Coradius
of s is given by
CR(s) = max
s /  B(s)
min{W(P, )|s
     B(s),(P, )   P(s
 ,s
  )}
and is a measure of how hard it is to reach s.
Proposition 2. Suppose a state s   S is such that R(s) > CR(s). Then,
the stochastically stable states are exactly those in L(s).
Proof. Let s    S, s  /   B(s). Let (T  ,  )   T (s ) solve min(T, ) T (s ) W(T, ).
Consider the tree T   and the complete path from s to s  in this tree. Since
s  /   B(s), this path eventually leaves the basin of attraction of s. Let s1 be
the ﬁrst state in this path which is not in B(s). Delete the part of the path
from s to s1. For all states but s that have become disconnected, the fact
that they are in B(s) allows to connect them to s (adding the corresponding
transitions) with waste zero. If this creates any duplicated edges in the graph,
delete the duplicate, but keep only the revising set which ensures waste zero.
This saves a waste weakly larger than R(s) (by deﬁnition of Radius).
13There is a subtle di erence between our result and Ellison’s (2000). Ellison deﬁnes the
basin of attraction of a state s as the set of states from which the (unperturbed) dynamics
will eventually lead to s with probability one, whereas we deﬁne the basin of attraction of
s as the set of states such that the unperturbed dynamics (i.e. that involving zero-waste
transitions only) leads to s with positive probability.
14Add to the revision tree a revision path (P, )   P(s ,s) which solves
min{W(P, )|s     B(s),(P, )   P(s ,s   )}. Delete any duplicated tran-
sitions created when adding (P, ), keeping the revising sets in  . This
increases the waste by weakly less than CR(s) (by deﬁnition of Coradius).
After these two operations we have constructed a new revision tree, rooted
in s. If CR(s) <R (s), the total waste has been strictly reduced. It follows
that the stochastic potential of s is strictly smaller than the stochastic po-
tential of any s  not in the basin of attraction of s, thus the latter can not
be stochastically stable by Theorem 1.
Consider now a state s    B(s) such that s/   B(s ). Consider a minimal-
waste s -revision tree. Since s/   B(s ), in the path connecting s to s 
contained in this tree there exists some transition, say from s1 to s2, which
causes strictly positive waste. Delete it. Since s    B(s), there exists a zero-
waste revision path from s  to s. Add this path to the revision tree, deleting
duplicated transitions. The result is an s1-revision tree with strictly smaller
waste, thus again by Theorem 1, s  cannot be stochastically stable.
Last, consider any states    L(s), s   = s. Clearly, minimal waste revision
trees for both states must have the same waste. In summary, no state out
of L(s) can be stochastically stable, but all states in L(s) have the same
stochastic potential. Since there are ﬁnitely many states, there must exist
states with minimum stochastic potential and the conclusion follows.  
Following Ellison (2000), it is possible to extend this result in two ways.
The ﬁrst would allow to apply the analysis to sets of states rather than a single
state. The second would deal with the concept of “modiﬁed coradius”, which
subtracts the radius of intermediate states when computingthe coradius, thus
providing a more involved but stronger result.
4 Learning in Best-Response Potential Games
In this Section, we illustrate the use of our characterization and provide
deﬁnite answers to the questions we posed above, that is, to which extent
15are the ﬁndings of convergence to Nash equilibria and selection of potential
maximizers robust. To check robustness with respect to the dynamics, we will
consider arbitrary revision processes as discussed above. To check robustness
with respect to the class of games, we will consider the various generalizations
of the concept of potential game.
4.1 Generalized Potential Games
As mentioned in Section 2.2, a ﬁnite normal form game   =( I,(Si,u i)i I) is
an (exact) potential game if there exists a function   : S    R (the potential)
such that
ui(si,s  i)   ui(s
 
i,s  i)= (si,s  i)    (s
 
i,s  i) (P)
for all i   I, si,s  
i   Si, and s i   S i. The set of potential maximizers has
been shown to be an appealing equilibrium reﬁnement for thisclass of games.
However, it can also be argued that the class of potential games is relatively
narrow. Monderer and Shapley (1996) generalized this class as follows.  
is a weighted potential game if (P) is replaced by ui(si,s  i)   ui(s 
i,s  i)=
wi ( (si,s  i)    (s 
i,s  i)) for ﬁxed weights wi > 0, i   I. Further,   is an
ordinal potential game if (P) is replaced by the property that ui(si,s  i)  
ui(s 
i,s  i) and  (si,s  i)  (s 
i,s  i) have the same sign. Last,   is a generalized
ordinal potential game if (P) is replaced by the property that ui(si,s  i)  
ui(s 
i,s  i) > 0 implies that  (si,s  i)    (s 
i,s  i) > 0.
The appeal of generalized ordinal potential games rests on the follow-
ing characterization. A ﬁnite game is generalized ordinal potential if and
only if it has the Finite Improvement Property, that is, if any path of states
generated through unilateral deviations involving strict improvements is nec-
essarily ﬁnite.
Obviously, every potential game is a weighted potential game, every
weighted potential game is an ordinal potential game, and every ordinal
potential game is generalized ordinal potential. Voorneveld (2000) has pro-
vided a di erent generalization of the class of ordinal potential games, and
has shown that it is neither included in nor includes the class of generalized
16ordinal potential games. The game   is a best-response potential game if
there exists a function  BR : S   R such that  i   I, and s i   S i,
argmax
si Si




Best-response potential games admit a characterization as follows (see
Voorneveld (2000, Theorem 3.2)). A normal form game with ﬁnitely many
players and countable strategy sets is a best-response potential game if and
only if any path of states generated through unilateral best responses, and
containing at least one strict improvement, is non-cyclic.
4.2 A Convergence Result
We turn now to the question of convergence to Nash equilibria.14 Theorem
1 allows the following ﬁrst, immediate observation. In generalized ordinal
potential games, convergence to Nash equilibria is not guaranteed, even under
asynchronous learning. In other words, non-Nash states can be stochastically
stable. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 1. Consider asynchronous learning. The following 2 2 game (left-







Payo  Table G.O. Potential
14Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) use stochastic approximationtechniques to study con-
vergence of closely-related dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria in potential and super-
modular games. The strategy is taking the limit as the population size grows to inﬁnity
and the time interval goes to zero, and approximating the paths of the dynamics through
a di erential equation. In contrast, we study convergence directly on the ﬁnite, ﬁxed-
population-size, discrete-time dynamics. Baron, Durieu, Haller, and Solal (2002a) have
established convergence of the asynchronous logit-response dynamics to partial Nash con-
ﬁgurations, i.e. strategy proﬁles where at least one player is choosing a best response.
17The only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is (b,a). This game has a gener-
alized ordinal potential   given by the right-hand-side table. However, the
game exhibits a best-response cycle, and hence is not a best-response po-
tential game. This best-response cycle contains the links (aa,ab), (ab,bb),
(bb,ba), and (ba,aa). Since each of these transitions is a best response for
the updating player, we can construct a zero-waste revision tree for all four
states. In conclusion, all four states are stochastically stable, even though
only one of them is a Nash equilibrium.15
This example shows that non-Nash states can be stochastically stable in
generalized ordinal potential games under the logit-response dynamics with
asynchronous learning. Thus, the next question of interest is when does
convergence to Nash equilibria obtain. The example above shows that the
answer is negative for the class of generalized ordinal potential games.
As an application of Theorem 1, though, we can answer this question
in the a rmative for best-response potential games, and hence ordinal po-
tential games. We will also simultaneously perform a robustness check of
the convergence result to variations in the way players are chosen to update
strategies. Say that a revision process is regular if q{i} > 0 for all i   I. Both
standard revision processes in the learning literature, asynchronous learning
and independent learning, are clearly regular.
Theorem 2. If   is a ﬁnite best-response potential game, the set of stochas-
tically stable states of the logit-response dynamics with any regular revision
process is contained in the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Fix a state s0   S which is not a Nash equilibrium of  , and hence
there exists a coordinate i   I such that maxsi Si ui(si,s 0
 i) >u i(s0). Con-
sider any revision tree (T 0, 0)   T (s0) with associated waste W(T 0, 0).




i   argmaxsi Si ui(si,s 0
 i). Add the link (s0,s 1) with revising set {i}
15In particular, state ab is among the stochastically stable states, even though the set
of Nash equilibria is {[(p,1   p),a]|0   p   1
2}, i.e. player 2 never plays strategy b in an
equilibrium.
18(which is possible by regularity of the revision process) and delete the link
(s1,s 2) leaving s1 in T 0. The new graph is a tree T 1   T (s1). The additional
transition from s0 to s1 causes no waste by deﬁnition of s1. If the contribution
of the deleted link (s1,s 2) to W(T 0, 0) was positive, W(T 1, 1) <W(T 0, 0)
holds.16
If the contribution was zero and thus W(T 1, 1)=W(T 0, 0), proceed
as follows. Add a link (s1,ˆ s2) with revising set {i} where ˆ s2 =( s2
i,s 1
 i)
for some i    0(s1,s 2) such that s2
i  = s1
i. This causes zero waste because
(s1,s 2) caused zero waste. Delete the link (ˆ s2,s 3) leaving ˆ s2 in T 1. The new
(labelled) graph is a revision-tree (T 2, 2)   T (ˆ s2), with zero waste for the
link (s1, ˆ s2).
Iterate the described procedure until deletion of a positive waste link
(ˆ sn,s n+1) occurs, i.e. move along a best-response compatible path of states.
Since   is a best-response potential game, any such path, which started with
a strict improvement for a player, is non-cyclic (Voorneveld (2000, Theorem
3.2)), such that iteration actually ends with a revision tree( T n, n)   T (ˆ sn)
where ˆ sn  = s0 and W(T n, n) <W (T 0, 0). Hence no (T, )   T (s0) can
have minimum waste and, by Theorem 1, s0 is not stochastically stable.  
This result generalizes both the class of potential games and the class
of logit-response dynamics for which convergence to Nash equilibria obtains.
The proof relies crucially on the characterization of ﬁnite best-response po-
tential games, that is, the property that any path of states generated through
unilateral best responses, containing at least one strict improvement, is non-
cyclic. This property is not necessarily fulﬁlled by generalized ordinal poten-
tial games (e.g. it fails in Example 1)
The assumption of regularity of the revision process cannot be dropped.
To see this, consider instantaneous learning, where every player receives re-
vision opportunity with probability one. In this case, convergence to Nash
equilibria can fail even for exact potential games.
16We use the term “waste of a link” as a shortcut for “waste of the revision tree formed
by a single link and the chosen revising set”.
19Example 2. The following 2   2 game is symmetric, and hence an exact
potential game (and also a best-response potential game). It has two strict







Payo  Table Exact Potential
Under asynchronous learning, both Nash equilibria are stochastically sta-
ble, since they both maximize the potential. With our approach it is easy
to verify that the same holds under independent learning. Now consider in-
stantaneous learning. Once a Nash state is reached, a waste of 1 is required
to leave it, i.e. one of the updating players needs to make a mistake to move
to either (a,b) or (b,a).17 Once the process reaches either (a,b) or (b,a), it
alternates between these two states if nobody makes a mistake. Leaving this
cycle again causes a waste of 1. Hence the stochastic potential of all states
is 2, and they are all stochastically stable. That is, convergence to Nash
equilibria might fail even for exact potential games.
4.3 The Irrelevance of Potential Maximizers
This leads us to the second question of interest, namely whether potential
maximizers are selected by the logit response dynamics in general. The
following example shows that states which globally maximize the potential
function of a weighted potential game might fail to be stochastically stable.
Thus, although all stochastically stable states of the logit-response dynamics
are Nash equilibria for best-response potential games, stochastic stability
does not support the use of potential maximizers as an equilibrium reﬁnement
for any generalization of potential games, even with asynchronous learning.
17Moving directly from one of the Nash states to the other causes a waste of 2, because
both players must make a mistake.
20Example 3. Let   be an asymmetric, pure-coordination, 2   2 game with








Payo  Table Weighted Potential
This game has a weighted potential   given by the right-hand-side table and
weights w1 = 1 and w2 =1 /4. The equilibrium (b,b) is the (unique) potential
maximizer.
Consider asynchronous learning. It is straightforward to construct the
minimum-waste trees. Note that, since the game is a strict coordination
game, states (a,b) and (b,a) can be connected to either of the pure Nash
equilibria at zero waste. Thus the minimum waste of a (b,b) tree is equal to
the minimum waste necessary to leave (a,a), and vice versa. The waste of
the link (a,a)    (b,a) is w1·(2 0) = 2; the waste of the link (a,a)    (a,b)
is w2 · (2   ( 6)) = 2. Thus the stochastic potential of (b,b) is 2. Consider
now state (b,b). The waste of the link (b,b)    (a,b) is w1 · (4   ( 6)) = 10;
the waste of the link (b,b)    (b,a) is w2 · (4   0) = 1. Hence the stochastic
potential of (a,a) is 1 and we conclude that (a,a) is stochastically stable,
despite not maximizing  . This result can also be derived using the Radius-
Coradius Theorem. Obviously, R(a,a)=CR(b,b) = 2 and CR(a,a)=
R(b,b) = 1, implying that (a,a) is stochastically stable.
This example shows that the selection of potential maximizers for the
asynchronous logit-response is not robust even to slight generalizations of
the class of potential games. Now we consider whether the result is robust
to generalizations of the class of revision processes.
There are two major di erences between the asynchronous-learning case
and, say, a process with independent learning. First, the set of revision
21trees for each state grows, since transitions between any two states become
possible. Second, each transition in which not all N players change their
action becomes possible via more than one revising set.
Concerning stochastic stability, though, this second issue raises no di -
culties. Consider the link (s,s ) where the players in J change their action,
and assume that a revising set J    J is selected for this transition. It is easy
to see that the corresponding waste can only be larger than if the revising
set J was selected instead, because sticking to their action might be a non-
best response for players in J  \ J. Hence, when computing the stochastic
potential of a state, we can restrict attention to selections for trees that pick
the most “parsimonious” revising sets, which prescribes a unique selection
for each tree.18
The larger set of trees can, however, substantially change other results.
We proceed to show that, under independent learning, potential maximizers
may fail to be selected even in exact potential games. Thus the result of
Corollary 1 is not robust to changes in the speciﬁcation of revision opportu-
nities either.
Example 4. Consider a 3   3   2-game with exact potential as given below.
Player 1 chooses rows, player 2 chooses columns, and player 3chooses tables.
The payo s of pure-strategy Nash equilibria are marked by an asterisk.
g
d e f
a 10  6 0
b 6 0 0
c 0 0 9 
h
d e f
a 0 0 0
b 0 1  1 
c 0 1  1
Under asynchronous learning, the potential maximizing state (a,d,g) is stochas-
18Essentially, that is the reason why Theorem 2 holds for any regular revision process.
22tically stable by Corollary 1. Consider independent learning instead. The
basin of attraction of state (c,f,g) contains all states except (a,d,g), (a,e,g)
and (b,d,g). Any minimal waste path from (c,f,g) to one of these states, for
example the path ((c,f,g),(a,f,g),(a,d,g))or ((c,f,g),(c,f,h),(c,d,h),(b,d,g))
is associated with a waste of 9, such that R(c,f,g) = 9. The transition
((a,d,g),(b,e,g)), though, has an associated waste of only 8 when players 1
and 2 switch simultaneously. The states (a,e,g) and (b,d,g) can be connected
to B(c,f,g) at an even lower waste, such that CR(c,f,g) = 8. Proposition
2 then implies that (c,f,g) is stochastically stable, despite the fact that it
does not maximize the exact potential.
5 Generalizations and Extensions
Although we have focused on the logit-response dynamics, our approach to
stochastic stability is susceptible of generalization to a wider class of learning
processes. In this Section, we brieﬂy report on this generalization.
Consider a Markov chain {Xt}t N on a ﬁnite state space  . Denote the
stationary transition probabilities by P ,   = Pr(Xt =   |Xt 1 =  ). A
transition mechanism from state   is a mapping Q :     R+ such that
Q(  ) > 0 for at least some       . The interpretation is that from a
given state  , there might be di erent, alternative processes giving rise to a
transition to other states. Conditional on the transition mechanism Q being




     
Q( 
  ).
Denote by M  the set of transition mechanisms available at  , and let
M =
 
    M . Note that the sets M  need not be pairwise disjoint, so that
a transition mechanism might be available at several or even all states (e.g.
a random mutation). Further, let M ,   = {Q   M |Q(  ) > 0}, i.e. the set
of mechanisms which are available at   and may lead to   .
23Definition 4. Let Xt be a Markov chain on the ﬁnite state space  .A
decomposition of Xt is a tuple (M ,q  )    such that, for each      ,
(i) M  is a nonempty, ﬁnite set of transition mechanisms,
(ii) q     M  is a full-support probability measure on M , and
(iii) for each       ,
P ,   =
 




      Q(   )
.
Obviously, any ﬁnite Markov chain admits a trivial (and not very useful)
decomposition with M  = {Q } and Q (  )=P ,   for all   .
Definition 5. A log-linear Markov family is a family of ﬁnite Markov chains
X
 
t with     [1,+ [, deﬁned on a common state space  , such that
(i) the chain Xt = X1
t is irreducible and admits a decomposition (M ,q  )   ,
(ii) each X
 
t with   > 1 admits a decomposition (M 
 ,q  )    given by
M
 
  = {Q
 
 |Q    M }
where lnQ 
 (  )=  · lnQ (  ) whenever Q (  ) > 0 (and Q 
 (  )=0
otherwise).
A log-linear Markov family can be seen as an interpolation between the X1
t
chain (the “pure noise” chain) and a “limit chain” as      . Irreducibility
of the pure-noise chain implies irreducibility of all chains in the family, but
not of the limit chain. A state   is stochastically stable if lim    µ ( ) > 0,
where µ  is the invariant distribution for   > 0.
Example 5. Consider the logit-response dynamics with revision process q. Its
decomposition corresponds to equation 4. That is, the transition mechanisms
QJ available at a state s correspond to the revising sets J, and QJ(s )=
e ·UJ(s ,s). The pure-noise chain corresponds to the   = 1 case, and the limit
chain is the best-response dynamics.
24Given a log-linear family, a transition tree is deﬁned analogously to a
revision tree, i.e. a pair (T, ) where T is a tree such that ( ,  )   T only if
M ,    =   and   : T    M is such that  ( ,  )   M ,   for each ( ,  )   T.
That is,   selects a transition mechanism for each link in the tree. Denote
the set of all transition  -trees by T ( ).
Analogously to Lemma 2 in the Appendix, straightforward but cumber-
some computations allow to give an exact characterization of the invariant
distribution µ ( ). This in turn allows to establish the analogue of Theorem
2. The waste of a revision tree (T, )   T ( ) is deﬁned as
W(T, )=
 
( ,  ) T
 
max
     
Q ( ,  )( 
  , )
 
  Q ( ,  )( 
 , ).
The stochastic potential of a state   is deﬁned as W( ) = min(T, ) T ( ) W(T, ).
Theorem 3. Consider a log-linear Markov family. A state   is stochastically
stable if and only if it minimizes W( ) among states.
Log-linear Markov families can be used to analyze a large variety of learn-
ing models. In the case of the logit-response dynamics, transition mechanisms
correspond to di erent groups of players who are updating at the same time.
Transition mechanisms can, however, also be used to model alternative be-
havioral rules of the agents, such as imitation. Varying memory length, pos-
sibly correlated with the complexity of observed histories, or di erences in
observability of the others’ actions across players, states and points in time,
could all be captured through appropriately deﬁned transition mechanisms.
In this paper, we have focused on the logit-response dynamics and hence
it is natural to consider log-linear Markov families as a generalization. It
would of course be possible to further generalize the framework to allow for
perturbations which are not of the log-linear form. Such a framework would
allow to encompass e.g. the mistakes model as a particular case (with the
pure noise chain being the mutation process and the limit chain myopic best
reply). Related approaches have been pursued by Myatt and Wallace (2003)
25and Beggs (2005), who consider families of Markov chains with transition
probabilities P   such that the limits lim      1
  lnP
 
 ,   are well-deﬁned.19
6 Conclusions
The mistakes model of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993)
is analytically ﬂexible due to the well-known graph-theoretic characterization
of the stochastically stable states. It has been often criticized, e.g. by Bergin
and Lipman (1996), due to the sensitivity of the results to the speciﬁcation
of the noise process. Other dynamics, like the logit-response dynamics of
Blume (1993), present more solid foundations but analytical results can be
derived only for particularly convenient frameworks.
Here we have presented a characterization of the stochastically stable
states of a generalization of the logit-response dynamics. This new charac-
terization is in the spirit of the mistakes model. We have illustrated the ap-
proach studying convergence to the set of Nash equilibria ofthe logit-response
dynamics in general classes of games. Convergence obtains for best-response
potential games but fails for generalized ordinal potential games. The selec-
tion of potential maximizers in exact potential games appears to be a fragile
result, robust neither to generalizations of the considered game class nor to
the speciﬁcation of revision opportunities.
19Myatt and Wallace (2003) examine stochastic stability in a learning model where
payo s are perturbed by normally distributed shocks. They show that the addition of
a strictly dominated strategy can change the selection result. Following the approach
in Ellison (2000), Beggs (2005) uses graph-theoretic arguments to obtain general results
on waiting times. See also Dokumaci and Sandholm (2007). Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2007) examine perturbed best-response dynamics (including logit), but concentrate on
the large-population limit.
26A Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we introduce a few auxiliary concepts.
Then we use these concepts to provide an exact (but cumbersome) charac-
terization of the invariant distribution for ﬁxed, ﬁnite   in Lemma 2. Last,
we use this characterization to prove Theorem 1.
Given a graph G on the state space S, a mapping
  : G    P(I)
such that  (s,s )   Rs,s  for each (s,s )   G is called a revision selection
for G. For each transition in G, a revision selection for G picks exactly one
of the possible revising sets making that transition (potentially) possible.
Thus, a revision tree is a pair (T, ) made of an s-tree involving only feasible
transitions under the revision process q, and a revision selection   for T.
Denote the set of all revision selections for a graph G by S(G).
Let M = S   Rq denote the set of all pairs made of one state and one
revising set. Consider a subset N   M.Arealization r for N is a mapping
r : N    S such that r(s,J)   RJ
s for all s   S and all J   Rq, J  =  . The
set of all realizations for N is denoted R(N). A complete realization is just
a realization for M.
A completion of a revision tree (T, ) is a complete realization such that
r(s, (s,s )) = s  for all (s,s )   T. In words, a completion assigns a feasible
outcome for each state and each possible revising set such that, whenever
the revising set is the one speciﬁed by the selection for the (unique) arrow
leaving the state in the tree, the outcome is precisely the state this arrow
leads to. Let C(T, ) be the set of all completions of (T, ).
If   is a revision selection for a tree T and N  = {(s, (s,s ))|(s,s )  
T}, then R(N ) can be interpreted as the set of possible realizations of the
selection  .
27Lemma 2 (The Decomposition Lemma). The invariant distribution µ of the
logit-response dynamics with revision process q satisﬁes for each s    S
µ(s
 )  
 


















Proof. Let T0(s ) be the set of all s -trees. By Freidlin and Wentzell (1988,
Lemma 3.1),
µ(s






Note that s-trees including transitions which are not feasible under q con-
tribute zero to the sum above. Fix a tree T   T0(s ) such that all transitions
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The last term in brackets is a constant which is independent of both   and T,
and hence is irrelevant for proportionality of µ(s ). The proof is completed
observing that
 
(s,J) M UJ(r(s,J),s)=Q(r).  
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1, i.e. stochastically stable states are
those where the waste is minimized across revision trees.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix a revision process q. Let µ  denote the invariant
distribution of the logit response dynamics for noise level  . By Lemma 2
we have that, for every state s,
µ
 (s)  
 










J Rq UJ(r(s,J),s), and P(T, ) > 0 for all (T, ). As
     , only the completion r which maximizes Q(r) among all completions
for all revision trees (T, )   T (s) matters for stochastic stability of state
s, since its e ect dominates for large  . Speciﬁcally, stochastically stable
states, i.e. those satisfying that lim    µ (s) > 0, are exactly those states
s   S for which the expression
max




is maximal among all states.
For any given revision tree (T, ), the completion r  which maximizes
Q(r) among all completions r   C(T, ) clearly involves only best responses
29for all revising players on all pairs (s,J) /   N , i.e. in state-revising set pairs
not used for transitions in the revision tree.
Let rmax be a complete realization involving only best responses. Itfollows
that a state s   S maximizes max(T, ) T (s) maxr C(T, ) Q(r) if and only if it











U (s,s )(s ,s)   U (s,s )(rmax(s, (s,s )),s)
 
=  W(T, ), it fol-
lows that stochastically stable states are those having minimal stochastic
potential min(T, ) T (s) W(T, ).  
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